
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28 June 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

28 June 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Germany-Berlin: The Soviets are trying to dampen Western reaction to East Germany's current efforts to promote its claim to being a sovereign state.

The counselor of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin told a French diplomat at a reception late last week that "nobody" intends to modify the situation in Germany. Referring to press reports of Soviet and East German (GDR) troop movements, he added that the many rumors of a "crisis over Berlin" are baseless. He also noted there had been no East German helicopter flights for several days.

At the same time he implied the intermittent East German harassments of the past month would continue. He said that the GDR had the right to "draw all consequences" of its sovereignty.

In this regard, the West German Government has temporarily acquiesced in the GDR's unilateral denunciation of the Allied-sanctioned interzonal rail tariff agreement, effective 1 July, and it now appears that it will follow suit on the parallel denunciation of the barge agreement. The West Germans, however, do not expect any serious tie-ups.

The speech by GDR transport minister Kramer published on 25 June suggests that East Germany is likely to continue to press for signing formal agreements on these questions because of the implications of sovereignty they would carry.

Greece: Prime Minister Papandreou and King Constantine may be moving closer to a confrontation, although the climax could be several weeks away.

[Papandreou's victory in last Friday's vote of confidence strengthens his position to press for the removal of the right-wing army chief of staff, General Gennimatas. Papandreou received the votes or support of 170 of the 171 deputies of his Center Union (EK), some of whom had opposed him recently.]

Constantine
will resist Gennimatas' removal, dismissing
Papandreou if necessary and preventing elections—
which the EK would probably win now—for up to two
years. The King reportedly also plans to demand
a full investigation of the ASPIDA secret army or—
ganization in which the prime minister's son is in—
volved. Papandreou's widespread popular support
may force the King to take a less adamant position,
however, despite the implicit threat to royal authority
in Papandreou's plans.

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Congo: The political struggle between President Kasavubu and Premier Tshombe continues unresolved.

Kasavubu has announced that because of the recent court nullification of parliamentary election results in three provinces, the new parliament will not meet as scheduled on 30 June. He set no new date for convening it. This decision puts off the expected parliamentary approval of a new Tshombé government, and further delays the presidential elections—which are set by the constitution for six months after parliament is convened.

Kasavubu made no mention of any changes in the status of the current Tshombé "transition" government and presumably it will continue in power at least until the provincial elections are completed.

The nullifications—all in provinces where Tshombé supporters had won—appear to be part of the running political struggle between Kasavubu and Tshombé revolving around control of the powerful office of the presidency. Kasavubu clearly hopes to retain the office; Tshombé, while making public and private denials, almost certainly intends to run against him, if he cannot work out a private agreement with Kasavubu.

Kasavubu's tactic seems to be to avoid a frontal attack against Tshombé in the hope that time will weaken Tshombé's strong political party, Conaco, which-before the nullifications--controlled at least 112 of the 166 national deputies, and 13 of the provincial governments.

NOTES

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Ghana: In addition to the long-planned strike in Takoradi, about which the government is well informed, strikes now are expected also in Ghana's mining communities, in the port of Tema, and possibly in Kumasi, an anti-Nkrumah stronghold. Government efforts, already under way in Accra, to explain its highly unpopular pension scheme--to go into effect on 1 July--may have an important bearing on strike sentiment. If the strikes occur and result in a breakdown of order, army elements will be under even greater pressure to intervene with the aim of ousting Nkrumah.

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Sudan: The moderate-dominated government, in power only two weeks, is facing its first major crisis in the constituent assembly over a government proposal to amend the constitution. Younger and generally extremist members of the National Union Party (NUP), the minority partner in the Umma-dominated coalition, are reportedly attempting to block the amendment as part of an effort to demonstrate their own strength over that of the NUP moderate wing. The government will probably be able to retain its parliamentary majority, but an open split within the NUP will certainly encourage increased maneuvering by the leftist opposition.

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008300490001-6 25X1 25X1 Burundi: /Tension between the Hutus and Tutsis is rising again in Bujumbura, apparently as a result of rumors of an impending Tutsi-instigated coup and unconfirmed reports that the pro-Western King--now sojourning in Switzerland--plans to abdicate. The Belgian commander of the Burundi Army ordered an alert on 25 June as a precautionary measure. Hutu-Tutsi relations have been badly strained since the Hutu national electoral victory this spring, and Hutu and Tutsi elements would probably each attempt to 25X1 seize power if the King were in fact to abdicate? British Guiana: /The government of Premier Burnham has arrested three top leaders of Cheddi Jagan's pro-Communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) in connection with the bombing of the US Consulate in Georgetown on 24 June. Jagan, who recently solicited the help of two of these leaders in selecting saboteurs, has apparently decided to intensify the party's terrorist campaign. Burnham's stated plans to arrest other ranking PPP members in reprisal for 25X1 any future terrorist acts would tend to reduce the

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threat to security.7

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